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"ALL HIS WANTS SHOULD BE
PROMPTLY SUPPLIED”:
PERSIFOR F. SMITH AND THE CALOOSAHATCHEE RIVER
CAMPAIGN OF 1837-38
By Joe Knetsch
proximity to Holatoochee, will be more
important upon the results of the
campaign, perhaps, than those of any
other commander: All his wants should
be promptly supplied. The failure of his
column from want of transportation, or
from any other cause, would be most
disastrous, and might lead to the failure
of every other column.1
In Jesup’s plan of operation, access to the
west coast of Florida and the area approaching the Big Cypress Swamp had to be denied
to the Seminoles and their allies. It was the
job of Persifor Smith and his command to
stop the Indians from reaching these destinations. It was a crucial role in the complex
operations of the United States Army against
the Indians of Florida and one that Smith
was quite capable of performing to Jesup’s
satisfaction.
Persifor F. Smith in 1848
Simon Gratz Autograph Collection, Courtesy
Historical Society of Pennsylvania Philadelphia

Writing on December 28, 1837, the
"Maligned General," Thomas Sidney Jesup
ordered Major I. B. Brant, Quarter Master at
Tampa to take every measure possible to
keep the Louisiana Volunteers in good
supply. In his order he noted:
General Smith reports that he will have
eight hundred men in the field, and will
not have transportation for more than
half his force. His operations, from his

Persifor Frazer Smith was born in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1798 and later
graduated from the College of New Jersey
(now Princeton) in 1815. He took up the
study of the law while at school and moved
to New Orleans in 1819. Smith quickly
made his mark in the rough and tumble town
and rose rapidly in its politics.2 He married
into the family of the prominent Francois
Bureau, taking Bureau’s daughter, Francis
Jeanette, as his wife. He also became very
active in local militia matters, rising to
command of a battalion in a few short years.
In 1834, his strong political ally, Edward

Douglass White, became Louisiana’s first
Whig governor and appointed Smith to the
post of adjutant general in the following
year. With his political and military
connections in place, Smith soon received
the news of the outbreak of hostilities in
Florida and was in a position to come to the
aid of the Territory when General Edmund
P. Gaines requested such in early 1836.3
Dr. Canter Brown, Jr. has recently shown
the importance of Smith’s role in the 1836
campaign. Brown has also noted the
difficulties that Smith encountered in raising
the first force of volunteers, including
getting White to help gather the funds for
the thirty dollar per man bounty. The
internal politics of this command, well
documented by Brown, show the tense
situation in New Orleans. These included
having White turn down a request by his
rival for governor, Major General John B.
Dawson, to lead the volunteers in Florida.
The governor got around the seniority of
Dawson by politely noting that the call for
troops from General Gaines was for a
colonel’s command, eight companies, and as
Dawson insisted upon maintaining his rank,
the request was denied in favor of Smith.
Soon thereafter, Persifor Smith led the
volunteers upon the perilous voyage to
Tampa to begin their service.4
Smith’s troops served with valor and
distinction during their tenure in Florida.
They suffered many of the hardships of
army life on the frontier, including bad food,
mosquitoes, worn out clothes and shoes and
impossible country for campaigning. Their
Peace River expedition was difficult and
without many positive results, except the
exploration of about fifty-two miles of new
territory, before the food ran out and they
were forced to return to Charlotte Harbor.
The volunteers returned to Fort Brooke on
April 25, 1836, where they were greeted by

orders for their departure back to Louisiana,
thus ending their brief, but difficult service.5
The performance of the Louisiana
volunteers under Smith’s leadership was
outstanding and widely recognized in the
ranks of the regular army, something highly
unusual in a war where volunteers were
normally considered second-rate soldiers at
best. In late July of the following year,
Smith, again, offered to lead Louisiana’s
volunteers into the field in Florida. This time
the command of the regular army was in the
hands of Major General Jesup, someone
who knew about Smith’s capabilities. As he
noted to Secretary of War Joel Poinsett:
Sir: I enclose a copy of a letter received
today from General P. E Smith, of
Louisiana. The general commanded a
regiment under General Scott and General Gaines in the first campaign, not
only with credit, but with distinction. If
he could bring a regiment of infantry
into the field- and I have no doubt of his
ability to do so- the service would be
greatly benefitted. By adding to his
regiment a small body of regular troops
he would be able, with naval
co-operation,
to
commence
his
operations at Charlotte Harbor, or
further south, and destroy or drive out
the parties of Indians in the southern
portion of the peninsula. . . . I consider it
of the utmost importance that a regiment
should be obtained from Louisiana, and
of equal importance that General Smith
should command it.6
But, this time, the terms of the service would
have to be different. As Smith noted in his
letter of July 30, 1837, to Jesup: "The
regiment I commanded in 1836 left the service of the United States highly and justly
discontented with it. They had served the
whole time faithfully; indeed, had passed it

nearly two weeks, had been the whole time
in constant activity, and when they arrived
here, in rags and poverty, found not the
slightest preparation on the part of the
government
to
pay
them
off,
notwithstanding the most positive orders on
the part of General Scott." The governor of
the state, Smith reminded Jesup, actually
had to borrow money to pay the command.
The army paymaster, who was supposed to
have reimbursed the men for expenses, was,
in one last bit of frustration for the
volunteers, remanded to Alabama and was
not on hand in time to perform the required
duty. Yet, Smith stated hopefully, a year had
passed since this ugly incident and it was
probable that he could raise the troops Jesup
needed for his Florida campaign.7
Two of the major reasons for Jesup’s
enthusiasm for Smith’s Louisiana volunteers
were their proximity, compared to Kentucky
or Tennessee, and the fact they came from
an area with a more similar climate.8
Another factor which weighed heavily upon
the reasoning of Joel Poinsett was the very
cumbersome arrangements necessary to
properly staff a volunteer unit, especially
under an inexperienced commanding officer.
Smith, having proven himself an able and
willing administrator, would be able to
avoid most of the petty grievances
frequently voiced by elected volunteer
leaders. Also, the expense and time spent in
gathering a new force would be greatly
reduced with Smith in charge of the
operation.9 Taken altogether, Persifor Smith
was the ideal candidate to lead a major
volunteer force when combined with regular
troops against the stubborn foe.
After looking into business affairs in
Philadelphia during most of September,
Smith returned to New Orleans where his
junior officers were already raising the
required force.10 By November 2, 1837,

Persifor Smith and the Louisiana volunteers
had left New Orleans, bound for Tampa.
There he was supposed to meet with five
companies of Philadelphia troops and units
of the 2nd Infantry to outfit and get supplies
for their trip to the Caloosahatchee country.
The force from Louisiana was about two
hundred and fifty men.11 The Philadelphia
force raised was to be about five hundred
men, which, as noted earlier, meant that
when Smith was ready to embark from
Tampa, his force would number about eight
hundred men.12
Smith’s force was to be but one element in a
much larger, more elaborate plan than any
yet attempted in Florida. Jesup’s plan was
very involved and set into motion as many
as nine different columns at one time.13 The
main thrust of the plan, however, involved
four columns, each entering the southern
end of the peninsula from different routes,
driving the Indians into the center of the
Everglades and isolating them from any
chance for outside assistance. Through
constant campaigning and pressure on the
food supply, Jesup hoped to end the war by
March or April of 1838. To do this
effectively would require that his forces
would be in the field by no later than
October. This hope was not to be. As the
master planner stated:
I had desired to commence operations on
the 1st of October, because, at that time,
the St. John is navigable a greater
distance that at a later period; and I
could avail myself of more than two
months of the services of the Florida
troops, whose term of service expired in
December. The regular troops, however,
did not begin to arrive until near the last
of October, and they continued to come
in until December. The principal
volunteer force arrived about the 1st of
December.14

The late arrivals of the various forces meant
that the campaign started later in the dry
season and would have to end before the
beginning of the rainy season. The tatter
meant sickness, death and impossible
conditions for a campaign against the
Indians.
While Jesup, himself, led forces up the St.
Johns River from Fort Mellon, General
Joseph Hernandez and his Florida militia
would scour the area between the St. Johns
and the Atlantic coast. As the distance
between these two forces narrowed, the
Alabama and Tennessee volunteers and
others joined with Hernandez’s column and
attempted to push the enemy further into the
Everglades and deny them the coast. The
movement of these troops led to the
foundation of a number of establishments,
namely Forts Pierce, Jupiter, Lauderdale,
Christmas and Bankhead on Key Biscayne.15
Just as important to the overall success of
the campaign were the western columns,
outfitted and embarking from Tampa. As
Jesup described the first of these: "General
Taylor was directed to proceed from Tampa
Bay, open a road in nearly an eastern
direction into the heart of the country,
establish a post on the head of Peas creek,
another on the Kissimmee, and attack the
enemy in that quarter."16 This he did with
his actions culminating in the Battle of Lake
Okeechobee, fought on Christmas Day
1837. The other column, was to rendezvous
in Tampa and enter the field through the
Caloosahatchee River. The operations of this
column covered the whole country from
Fisheating Creek, which enters Lake
Okeechobee from the west, to Cape Sable,
where forces under Colonel Thomas Lawson
established Fort Poinsett. This column’s
activities resulted in the establishment of
Forts Deynaud, Center and Keais

(pronounced Keys) and the eventual capture
of two hundred and forty three prisoners.17
Each of these two columns had specific
assignments. Smith’s was to deny the enemy
access to the coast and the Big Cypress
Swamp. The former because of the potential
for gaining arms and supplies and the latter
because it was known to be an impossible
area in which to successfully campaign.
Also of importance, was the need to keep
the Indians south of the settlements and
away from their brethren further north.
Taylor’s troops were to swing around to the
east of the big lake and, after establishing
Forts Basinger and McCrea, close off any
communication with the north via the
Kissimmee River valley or the reaches of
the upper St. Johns River. With the constant
movement of troops from the coastal forts,
like Fort Lauderdale, Poinsett, Dallas and
Jupiter, pushing inland, attacking the
Seminoles and their allies on the "islands" of
the Everglades and denying the enemy the
"coontie" grounds in southeastern Florida,
Jesup felt confident that his campaign would
have very positive results in ending the
war.18 The total force at his command, by
January of 1838, was 8,993; 4,637 regulars,
4,078 volunteers, 109 seamen and 178
Indians.19 All of this depended not only on
the valor of the troops, but the reliable
delivery of supplies and arms.
The supply problem for such a large
undertaking as this campaign was enormous.
The proper boats had to be ordered from
Philadelphia and New York; specially
designed steamboats had to be constructed
to accommodate Florida’s shallow waters;
pontooniers had to be organized and
assembled; boatbuilders had to be on hand
for special needs; great quantities of forage
and food had to be advanced to the fighting
stations; articles for the construction of the
frontier fortifications had to be obtained and

forwarded to the troops; necessary animals
had to be procured for the mounted troops
and wagon-masters; huge numbers of rations
had to be prepared in advance; medical
supplies had to be assembled, along with
obtaining the medical officers, regular and
volunteer, to use them properly; tents,
shovels, canteens, belts, caps, etc. all had to
be ordered, assembled, shipped and
forwarded to the front lines of four major
columns. The tasks were daunting and
complicated in the extreme. In a lengthy
memorandum to Major Collins, Jesup listed
the articles needed for an "advanced Depot":
400 blankets for packsaddles, 6 crosscut
saws, 200 pounds of spikes, 2,000
horseshoes with nails, 400 cast steel axes, 20
froes, 20 Broad axes, 3 complete sets of
blacksmith’s tools, 20 coils of rope for
packing, 800 packing bags, 2,000 pounds of
iron, pitch for boats. Many other “essential"
items that the average "advanced Depot"
would need to supply the troops in the field
could be listed from the above
memorandum, however, those materials
listed will suffice for demonstration
purposes.20 The logistics of this campaign in
the swamps of Florida were difficult,
complex and, in the end, highly frustrating
to the clever general.
As noted earlier, Smith's departure from
Tampa was delayed by the fact that he had
little in the way of transportation to get him
and his command to southern Florida. Jesup,
whose office as Quartermaster General of
the Army was responsible for getting
supplies to the armies in the field, fumed at
the constant delays his command suffered
during the early part of the campaign. The
commander's correspondence throughout
this campaign is filled with urgent requests
for supplies: "Sir, Send forward to this place
[Fort Lane] without delay, the boats which I
directed some time ago. I mean barges or
flats of the second size. The movement of

the troops will be greatly embarrassed if
they should not arrive, had they been sent up
when I requested them they could have been
sent forward with forage yesterday."21 Basic
necessities, such as shoes and other articles
of clothing were often lacking or not
forwarded to the frontier soon enough. In
one notable incident, the lack of shoes
greatly delayed the posting of nearly four
hundred troops because the saw palmetto
had disabled some of the men and the
General refused to move them further south
until the articles needed were supplied.22
Always aware of the men's morale, Jesup
found it intolerable that other consurnables
were lacking or of such poor quality that
they were unfit for use, even by the regular
troops: "Greatly to my surprise," he wrote
on December 29, 1837; "on my return to this
post yesterday, I ascertained that there was
neither sugar or coffee here for the troops.
This is a most unpardonable neglect of some
officer of the Commissarys Department.
Report, without delay, the cause of this
neglect.... The Beans sent to the Army are
utterly unfit for issue, if you send any of
them send those that are fresh."23 Delays in
troop movement, improperly packaged
supplies, not enough equipment for the
forward posts, lack of transportation
facilities and a myriad amount of other
factors caused Jesup great worry and may be
one of the more important reasons in the
failure of the campaign.
Jesup did, however, have some ability to
adapt and adjust, as when he advised
Colonel Taylor to improvise in constructing
boats needed to explore the Kissimmee
chain of lakes. As Jesup advised:
I am induced [illegible word] from
information received from the Indians
and others, that the chain of Lakes
extending from Tohopkaliga to Pahai
Okee may be navigated by macinac

boats, if not by those of larger size.
Should we find this to be the fact,
supplies may be taken from Tampa to
the eastern side of the Okee chobee. (It
is doubtful whether wagons or even
packhorses can be taken to that point
from this side.) I will thank you to cause
a reconnaissance of those lakes to be
made as far at least as the last named,
and if you find them navigable, cause
boats to be built, or brought from
Tampa, to be employed as transport on
them. Boat builders might be taken out
to Fort Gardner and the boats
constructed there. Canoes of Cypress
enlarged by sawing them through the
center from end to end, and widening
them by inserting timber between the
parts, in the manner of the fishing boats
used on Our bay, would be well adapted
to the service we shall have to perform.
If the Lakes are navigable, and boats can
either be built on them or brought from
Tampa, the war may be certainly closed
this winter.24
The innovation to be noted is, "in the
manner of the fishing boats used on Our
bay." Here Jesup is describing the
"Chesapeake Bay Log Canoe" which was
constructed in just the manner described by
the General. Jesup was very familiar with
the craft, having been in Washington D.C.
for many years. The beauty of this vessel is
its great carrying capacity with a light
draught of water. By extending the craft
outward, as described above, the
displacement becomes such that the canoe
can navigate in very shallow waters. This, of
course, was perfect for the streams and some
lakes of the Kissimmee chain and other
areas covered by this campaign. Jesup’s long
career in the army, in numerous frontier
assignments and in many important theaters
of war, made him aware of the need for such
adaption.25

While Jesup was making his way down the
east side of the peninsula, Persifor Smith
and his force were working their way up the
Caloosahatchee River. His mission, as noted
above, was to prevent the Indians from
attaining refuge in the Big Cypress Swamp
or from obtaining supplies from outside
along the west coast. Jesup was optimistic
about the possibility of ensnaring the enemy
in the heart of the Everglades. Writing to
Colonel Taylor in early 1838, he noted: "If
Colonel Smith can prevent the enemy from
passing to the West, or if he can place a few
boats on the Okee Chobee, to unite with
yours, or prevent the Indians from
occupying the Islands and Cypress Swamps
to the south of the Lake, I shall entertain no
doubt of a sweep."26 On the same day of this
letter, January 18, 1838, the General learned
of Colonel Smith’s capturing Holatoochee
and forty of his people, who, along with
eighty other
prisoners,
were
sent
immediately to Tampa and thence to New
Orleans.27 This capture made some national
news because it coincided with the surrender
of Jumper and his band to Colonel Taylor.
Smith’s position was reported as "still
westward of Col. Taylor."28 To assist Smith
and Taylor in holding the Indians in the
Everglades, a series of fortifications was
established around the lake and along the
coasts of Florida. From Smith’s forces came
the establishment of Fort Center, on
Fisheating Creek, Fort Deynaud, on the
Caloosahatchee River, Fort Keais, on the
northern edge of the Big Cypress Swamp,
and Fort Poinsett, on Cape Sable, which was
commanded by Colonel Thomas Lawson,
best known as the Surgeon General of the
Army. In regards to the latter post, Jesup
declared: "A post at or near Cape Sable
would hold the Indians in Check, and perhaps compel them to retrace their steps."29
The overall strategy of surrounding the
Seminoles and their allies in the Everglades,
destroying their crops, cutting off all pos-

sible outside supplies and forcing a final
confrontation or surrender was well thought
out and articulated, however, because of the
problems of supplies and the elusiveness of
Sam Jones’ and other bands, the concept
failed in actual application.
Jesup also had to manoeuvre in conjunction
with negotiations headed by a delegation of
Cherokee Indians, whose presence in Florida
was an additional burden on the commander.
Yet, though he appears to have had little
faith in the results of the negotiations,
General Jesup did participate in the
attempted diplomacy. As he reported in late
1837, he had met with the Cherokee
delegation, arranged a meeting with
Micanopy and other Seminole leaders, held
a conference where surrenders were agreed
to and seems to have acted in good faith
with the government’s policy. But he had no
faith in the Seminole leadership which, he
believed, had little or no influence over most
of the warring faction.30 Also, he insisted on
getting his forces in the desired positions
and having the supplies forwarded to them,
in case the negotiations failed. In a letter to
Secretary of War Poinsett, Jesup stated:
"General Hernandez will turn Indian river
with his mounted men, and pass the foot and
supplies across. I shall not allow his
operations, nor those of Colonel Taylor or
General Smith, to be checked for a moment
by the Seminole councils; and the delay of
this column will be more than
counterbalanced by the increased efficiency
of its means."31 After a year of experience
and frustration with negotiating with the enemy, the cautious General was not going to
be lulled into complacency.
Aside from the capture of Holatoochee and
his band and the surrender of Jumper to
Taylor, Jesup did not have the war wrapped
up as he had planned. Many factors
appeared to mitigate against a successful

conclusion in early 1838. In a moment of
frustration, he wrote:
Providence seems to have taken the
Seminoles under its special protection. I
have learnt since I wrote to you, that a
vessel loaded with Rice has lately
wrecked near New River, and that the
Indians had secured a great part of the
Cargo, this will give them subsistence
for some months to come. ... Act as you
may think best for the service; and
should approach Colo. Smith’s command
give him such instructions as from your
knowledge of the country and the enemy, you may consider proper, or unite
his force with yours if in your opinion
any important object can be obtained by
it.32
Indian cattle, too, proved to be something of
a problem for the army, in that special
attention was given to their capture or
purchase. If the wide ranging cattle could be
captured, killed or bought, the war would
end sooner. The reports given throughout
the campaign indicate that there were still
substantial numbers of these food animals
within procurement distance of the enemy at
any time. As the General noted to Colonel
Taylor: "It is of the utmost importance that
all the Indian Cattle be taken from them,
purchase all you can from the Indians and
negroes who come in."33 Keeping supplies
with which to carry on the war out of reach
of the Indian enemy proved to be a difficult,
if not impossible, task for Jesup’s forces.
The very nature of the fertile Everglades, the
free roaming cattle and hogs, the
comparative plentitude of game and the
occasional ship wreck all worked against the
general’s scheme of depriving the enemy of
supplies.
The plans of the army were also frustrated
by the constant barrage of intelligence, most

of it rumor or reports from "escapees" and
captives. The frequent references to reports
of Indian locations and numbers, all
differing from each other, shows how
difficult it was to accurately pin-point the
enemy’s camps. Reports like: "Aligator is on
the west side of the Okee Chobee not more
than one or two days march from Fort
Deynaud, so says an Indian whom I have
sent with a message to [illegible, although
probably Halotoochee] urging him to go into
the Fort."34 Or: "An Indian Negro who came
into camp on the evening of the 9th
informed me that several small parties of
Indians had crossed the Okee Chobee in
boats to the south west side, the same place,
perhaps, where Captain Munroe destroyed
the Canoes."35 Again: "An Indian who went
to the head of New River for his family
returned last evening, he reports that the
Indians, where he left them, were making
their way to a Pine Island a few miles from
the swamp at the head of the north branch of
New River."36 This constant stream of
intelligence, though sometimes accurate,
was often simple rumor and, maybe, even
disinformation, to use the modern term.
Good maps, too, were lacking. So uncertain
of the exact location of Lake Okeechobee
was John Lee Williams, that he did not
include this vast inland sea on his famous
map of 1837. The army’s lack of knowledge
in this area was also well known. As Jesup
explained to the secretary of war: "... the
greater portion of their country was
unexplored wilderness, of the interior of
which we were as ignorant as of the interior
of China. We exhibit, in our present contest,
the first instance, perhaps, since the
commencement of authentic history, of a
nation employing an army to explore a
country, (for we can do little more than
explore it) or attempting to remove a band of
savages from one unexplored wilderness to
another."37 The lack of accurate intelligence

was another major factor in the final failure
of Jesup’s intricate plan of operation.
Colonel Smith’s operations during this
campaign were closely followed in the press
and in the correspondence of his
commander. On March 1, 1838, for
example, Smith’s forces were reported to
have surrounded "a large body of Indians,
men, women, and children," on an island in
the Everglades and that, taken in
conjunction with the surrender of a large
force of Indians and Negroes at Tampa and
General Nelson’s success in central Florida,
would soon lead to the close of the war.38
On March 8, 1838, Smith was informed of
the approval of his plan to head further south
into the Everglades to campaign against the
enemy supposed to be in that region.39 Six
days later, Jesup informed Taylor that
Smith’s medical officer, a Doctor Steincke,
had left the command and that the Colonel
had no other medical officer under his
command. Jesup ordered Taylor to supply
one if it were in his power to do so.40 In
nearly every report of the expedition of
Taylor’s force reported in the media, Smith’s
contingent was mentioned, with the
exception of the debate over the Battle of
Lake Okeechobee, in which Smith’s forces
did not participate.
In reporting the progress of his campaign,
Persifor Smith, stated that he had left Fort
Deynaud and moved south on March 7th
with a company of Second Dragoons, a
battalion of Second Infantry, marines under
Captain Dulany and his own Louisiana
volunteers, with the exception of one
company he had left to garrison Fort Center.
On the edge of the Big Cypress Swamp: "I
erected on this spot, which is about 35 miles
S. by E. from Fort Deynaud a small work in
which I placed 20 days rations & one compy
of La. Volunteers, naming the work, until
the General’s pleasure is known, after one of

the officers who fell with Major
Dade.[Keais] This point is on the border of
the great Cypress Swamp & within miles of
the point where I found an Indian trail
entering it, when I was here on the 26th
Feby. our wagons could not well approach it
nearer." His men then took with them five
days rations upon their backs and proceeded
to enter the swamp. After "incredible labour
& fatigue, being all day Knee deep in water
and mud & on wet prairies where the slimy
surface is still more difficult," he searched
for five days trying to locate the enemy. He
was rewarded by finding a women and her
child, who then negotiated with the others to
come into Fort Keais or Fort Deynaud.
Smith then led his men out of the swamp to
await results. However, his description of
the territory is worth noting to indicate the
extreme difficulty of military operations in
this region of Florida.
The difficulties of this march through
this part of the country are beyond all
belief. No doubt the late rains have
increased them, but even in the best season, troops must operate without any
baggage but what they can carry on their
backs, and in case of sickness, wounds
or accident such as snake bites, the
sufferers must be carried on the men’s
shoulders, as we were obliged to do in
the latter case, a litter could not be
carried through some of the hammocks
we passed. One prisoner said the large
marsh we crossed was considered by the
Indians impassable, and in fact we found
no trail in that direction. But having
never had any guide here we have got to
be expert woodsmen. One prisoner was
sent home by the route we came, on
account of her children and the
difficulties of the way.41
The whole area, the valiant Colonel stated,
was under water during the rainy season,

making it impossible for campaigning. As
General Jesup observed: "Colonel Smith has
had a most arduous service. His operations
are a further proof that the Indians can be
concentrated by peaceful means only. . . ."42
By April 16, 1838, Colonel Smith’s forces
had had some relatively successful
campaigning under their belts and he could
report the gathering of one hundred and
seven Indians for transport to Tampa and
New Orleans. He noted in his report: "Some
come in every day & a party of 25 or 30 are
expected to day or tomorrow."43 By May,
the number had increased to one hundred
and twenty of the "Halvetochin tribe."44
Prior to his leaving the area, he was to
receive more prisoners, most of whom came
into him at Fort Keais and Fort Deynaud.
Once assembled, the prisoners were sent, via
Peace River to Tampa and thence to New
Orleans to await final transfer to the Indian
Territory.
Toward the end of March 1838, some of the
troops under Smith’s command were at the
end of their enlistments. This, of course,
caused many adjustments in the plans of the
high command, including the proposed
abandonment of Fort Poinsett, on Cape
Sable. Although this proposal was negated
quickly, the fact of its planned abandonment
gives an indication of how quickly
adjustments had to be made because of the
wide-spread use of volunteer forces with
limited enlistment periods. Smith had to see
that all arrangements for their transportation
and mustering were in place and carried out.
Some of the Philadelphia volunteers wanted
to be discharged at Tampa, while others,
particularly the Louisiana men, wished to be
mustered out at New Orleans. These
administrative details took up much time
and concentration of the Colonel
commanding and relied on the good
communications between posts for their

success. Overall, Persifor Smith carried out
all phases of command, including those of a
bureaucratic nature, with ability and
humanity.45
By the end of April, 1838, General Jesup
was seeing the ultimate end of the Seminole
War as something far removed from the
actions of his troops. He saw that the
Seminoles would never leave Florida unless
forced by circumstances and overwhelming
white numbers. He proposed that the area of
southern Florida be left in Indian hands for
the immediate future because the costs of
removal, in money and men lost, would be
too great. In essence, Jesup anticipated the
actual course of events, including the
reserving of lands in South Florida for
Indian occupation. He even predicted the
eventual passage of the Armed Occupation
Act of 1842 when he noted: "I think a corps
of Rangers should be raised in Florida of
about six companies, . . . it should be raised
for war, and each man should in addition to
his pay and emoluments, be allowed a
quarter section of land in receiving an
honorable discharge after the termination of
the war."46 He would later have the
opportunity to help provide the provisions
needed by the armed colonists.
Persifor Smith’s troops had performed their
duty well and honorably. Through the
rugged terrain of southern Florida, they had
trudged diligently and faithfully. No one
could have asked for more from a volunteer
force. In quoting the New Orleans
Commercial Bulletin, the Army and Navy
Chronicle described Smith’s return to
Louisiana:
The Soldier’s Return. — Our fellow
citizen, Gen. Smith, after a rugged tour
of duty through the swamps and
savannahs of Florida, has returned to the
bosom of his family, having reached our

city on the night before last. [May 1,
1838] He appears in fine health, though
somewhat reduced in flesh, from the
fatigues of the campaign. The scene of
his military operations was confined to
the southern and western territories of
Florida, below Charlotte's Harbor,
whither he was sent with a detachment
of three hundred men in pursuit of a
body of Indians. He hemmed in and
drove the enemy to the extremity of the
Peninsula, till they could fly no farther
and were glad at length to sue for peace.
After a talk with the chiefs, the whole
Indian camp, amounting to two hundred
and twelve in number, came in and
surrendered themselves as prisoners of
war. Having thus finished the campaign
and the term of their enlistment having
expired, Gen. Smith disbanded his forces
and returned home, where he is greeted
with the cordial welcome and high
commendations which his arduous
services rendered to the State so richly
merit.47
General Jesup had a less glowing account of
the exploits of the Louisiana volunteer's
contribution, although he noted a much
higher figure of Indians taken prisoner: "His
operations covered the whole country from
that river [Caloosahatchee] south to Cape
Sable. The results were one or two
skirmishes, in which he lost a few men,
probably killed some of the enemy, and took
243 prisoners."48
The Jesup campaign of t837-38 was an
elaborately planned affair which deserved
better results. However, It was plagued from
the very beginning with poor coordination
by the Commissary's Office, the almost total
non-performance of certain suppliers, poor
topographical information, the reliance upon
large numbers of limited-service volunteer
forces, including Smith's, and an impossible

task of bringing to an end a war against a
capable, resourceful and determined foe.
Jesup was fortunate in having many able
men in his ranks, too, including Smith,
Colonel James Bankhead, Colonel Zachary
Taylor, General Joseph Hernandez and
many others whose ranks were lower, but
whose names appear on the pages of history
in a more famous conflict of the 1860s.
Smith’s career after this second tour of duty
in Florida, was one of exemplary service. He
served with distinction on the benches of the
city court of Lafayette and Jefferson Parish.
His service in the Louisiana militia included
a tern of office as adjutant general during the
administration of Andre B. Roman.49
Smith’s military service in the Mexican War
brought him national attention and lasting
fame. There, he again served under Zachary
Taylor and, also, Winfield Scott, taking an
active roll in both Generals’ campaigns and
winning a brevet to Brigadier General. He
was distinguished for his bravery in the
Battle of Contreras and at Mexico City. He
later served as the military governor of Vera
Cruz in 1848. Persifor Smith was promoted
to the brevetted rank of Major General in
1849 and given the command of the
Division of the Pacific. Later service included commands of the Department of St.
Louis and the Department of Utah, where he
was put in command of a force preparing to
put down the Mormon disturbances. He was
given the full rank of Brigadier General in
1856. While preparing to lead his men into
Mormon territory, he died on May 17, 1858,
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Such was the
man who led the Louisiana volunteers
against the Seminoles of Florida from the
army based at Fort Brooke, Tampa, Florida
in 1837-38. He served us well.
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